


ESPIONAGE

PUBLISHED BY INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHERS, INC.
NEW YORK
JULY, 1937
PRINTED IN THE U.S.A.

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Espionage, wrecking and acts of diversion are tried weapons in the arsenal of bourgeois governments. These weapons are not only used in the struggle against potential enemies, but also against so-called friendly countries.

The enemies of the Soviet Union do not limit themselves to sending spies into the country and getting their people into important centers; they exert every effort to recruit dubious and unstable citizens of the

Soviet Union for their espionage system. They strive to draw them into their web of espionage, to push them onto the path of betraying their country and for this purpose resort to blackmail, bribery, deception and threats in order to compel them to serve the enemies of the Soviet Union. It must be borne in mind that the spy, diversionist and wrecker is dangerous because, disguising himself as "our" man, he penetrates into our ranks and takes advantage of our complacency and credulity in order to carry out the orders of his masters, to stab us in the back, to cause the death of numbers of Soviet citizens, to cause disasters and facilitate the victory of our enemies.

In order to hinder the enemy in his work, to prevent him from discovering our state secrets and from damaging our defenses and socialist construction, we must thoroughly learn the lessons that have been recently taught us, we must declare war against credulity and complacency which leave loopholes through which our enemies can penetrate into our midst. We must expose the cunning and devious paths by which foreign secret services recruit for their espionage system people who are not bad in themselves, who do not want to become traitors to their country, but who become spies because they lack vigilance and are unable to discern the enemy and his despicable designs beneath the mask of friendship and pretense.

Foreign secret services strive by various means to send their trained spies into other countries. These spies undergo a very thorough training before they are sent on espionage work to the particular country in which the secret service is interested.



During the World War there was the well-known case of the British agent "DN-27" who was trained at a school for spies in Devonshire. He went to Germany long before the war broke out, joined the army there as a volunteer and soon after obtained a commission as a lieutenant. Speaking German, English and French fluently, he was transferred to the Headquarters Staff of Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria who was in command of the Bavarian Corps near Lille. During the whole period of the war "DN-27" was in communication with the British Intelligence Service. Even in 1918, when the German Secret Service had managed to secure a list of the Allies' secret service agents, this officer, who at that time was already a colonel in command of a German regiment, still remained undiscovered. He revealed his identity himself in Spa, where he was sent as a German delegate for the armistice negotiations and openly joined the British delegation.

The sending of spies to other countries for the purpose of permeating the organism of the state is practised by all foreign secret services. At the same time they also study the inhabitants of neighboring countries for the purpose of singling out those who, under some pretence or other, or by one method or another, can be recruited for espionage work. It is well known that nearly all persons who receive a permit to leave Germany are obliged to present themselves to the Foreign Department of the National-Socialist Party, and the overwhelming majority of these receive instructions to conduct espionage work and also to study the people they come in contact with abroad.

The same system prevails in Japan. The study of citizens of foreign countries is pursued for one purpose only – to recruit them for espionage work. For example, before the World War, the German Secret Service had a special card index which recorded according to place of residence, occupation and description, all persons marked down as possible recruits for their espionage operations.*

* Before the war the German Secret Service had a list of 47,000 persons living in Russia, Great Britain and France. These people served as a reserve from which spies were recruited. To recruit them for espionage work all sorts of methods of blackmail, bribery, threats and provocation

These lists of "candidates" for espionage operations, who very often are the victims of blackmail, are drawn up on various grounds. Primarily, of course, attention is paid to politically unstable and wavering elements, then to people suffering from various weaknesses and vices, drunkards, perverts, people guilty of mishandling government money, embezzlers, etc.



Possessing these lists of people who are compromised in one way or another, the secret service takes advantage of the visits to foreign countries any of these people may make in order to recruit them for their espionage work. The secret services also send out agents to foreign countries to recruit agents from among the inhabitants of those countries. Spies sent to the Soviet Union undergo very careful training. They are taught to speak the language perfectly, they are compelled to read the Soviet press of the district to which they are to be sent, they are taught radio engineering, and during their course of training are obliged to listen to broadcasts from the Soviet Union. The Polish Secret Service, for example, makes it obligatory for their spies who are undergoing training for operations in the U.S.S.R. to read as "compulsory reading" special "lists of recommended literature" which they must be able to interpret in the spirit of Soviet criticism. These lists include such books as Sholokhov's *The Soil Upturned*, Furmanov's *Chapayev*, Panferov's *Bruski* and Ostrovsky's *How the Steel Was Tempered*. Recently, Polish spies have been obliged to study the new Soviet Constitution, the history of the Communist Party and material on the Stakhanov movement. They are expected to use Soviet terminology with ease.

Trained in this way, the spy-recruiting agents are sent to the U.S.S.R. as tourists or transit passengers, also they cross the frontier illegally, for the purpose of recruiting people for their espionage work.

Every spy sent to the Soviet Union from capitalist countries tries to acclimatize himself to Soviet conditions as quickly as possible, to acquire the appearance of a Soviet citizen and to obtain a situation. This is made easier in the Soviet Union owing to the absence of unemployment. The spy strives to get into a factory or into a government office, to make acquaintances there and watch carefully for

were resorted to, according to the character of the individual concerned.

likely recruits for his work. To facilitate his task the spy obtains a false or stolen passport, sometimes even a Communist Party book, and all sorts of certificates and recommendations. He sticks at nothing in order



to become legalized. For example, he looks out for a confiding woman, or a well-known Stakhanov girl, the daughter of a worker of long standing, marries her, and so becomes well-known himself in the factory as "so-and-so's husband," or "so-and-so's son-in-law," etc. To disguise himself more thoroughly the spy endeavors to distinguish himself as an "active" worker in social life and as a

Stakhanovite, or else resorts to flattery and toadying and even to frequent "marriages" and "divorces" with the view to obtaining the most suitable "partner."

Thus, taking advantage of the relaxing or complete absence of vigilance, the enemy penetrates our ranks and becomes "one of ourselves." After becoming well established in the factory or office the spy begins gradually to develop his recruiting work among our people in the effort to transform them into traitors to their country and to compel them to serve the foreign secret service.

As the recent trials of the Trotskyites, Zinovievites and Right renegades have shown, these enemies of the people quickly responded to the call of their masters in the fascist camp and tried to work conscientiously on behalf of Japanese-German fascism. The trial of the Trotskyite-Japanese-German agents showed that these despicable traitors, the Trotskyites, wreckers, spies and diversionists, sought their masters among the fascist secret service agents as eagerly as the latter sought for agents in the ranks of the Trotskyites.

It is much more difficult to recruit for espionage work those who have nothing in common with the Trotskyite traitors. The fascist spies do not ignore even honest people and resort to the most sordid methods to recruit them for espionage work. They get them mixed up in sordid financial and sexual affairs and then resort to blackmail and intimidation.

If the spy does not find people who fall ready victims to his snares because they are disgruntled, politically unstable, weak-willed, loose-tongued or suffering from various vices, he marks out his victims and artificially cultivates in them the qualities he needs: a sense of grievance, discontent, vices, and sometimes he deliberately compromises them in the eyes of their friends.

Cases have been known of anti-Soviet literature being sent to persons whom a foreign secret service had picked out as potential recruits, and watch was kept to see how they reacted to this. If the



victim did not inform anybody about the receipt of this counter-revolutionary leaflet, either his Party Committee or the Soviet authorities, or even if he destroyed the leaflet, the recruiting agent would visit him after a time and try to persuade him to work on behalf of the secret service. If the person in question expressed indignation at such a proposal and threatened to inform the authorities, the recruiting agent would calmly remind him of the receipt and concealment of the leaflet and point out that this could easily be proved through the postman who brought the letter, etc.

If the recruiting agent is unsuccessful at the first attempt, he is not disturbed. He visits his victim again later on and tries to intimidate him by stating that he would get into trouble for not reporting his first visit to the authorities. At first the agent demands information of a minor and almost not secret character which, he says, he needs very much. He offers his victim money and promises that if he consents this time he will not trouble him any more. If the victim yields, then it is all up with him; having "consented" once, he is dragged deeper and deeper into the mire. He cannot get out of it, because he has already compromised himself and he becomes a puppet in the hands of the cunning spy. To become more intimate with the recruits they have marked out for themselves, spies resort to all sorts of methods. Not infrequently Soviet people going abroad on business or for a cure are suddenly "recognized" in the train by a recruiting agent who appears to be delighted at the meeting and who turns out to be a "friend of the traveller's friend," etc. During the long journey the recruiting agent carefully sizes up his victim, finds out his weak spots and begins to weave his web. Very often he takes advantage of meetings at health

resorts, where there is plenty of spare time, where there are opportunities for excursions and where acquaintances are made more freely, especially with interesting and obliging people who at first sight arouse no suspicion.



A number of cases have occurred where espionage recruiting agents provided naive people with "wives." These wives took a "keen" interest in their husband's work and wheedled secrets out of them. When she had obtained sufficient material to compromise her "husband" politically, such a wife revealed her cards and bluntly proposed that he accept a well-paid job in "her" secret service. Not all the people who found themselves in such a situation had the courage to do the honest thing to extricate themselves from it. And the spies took advantage of this to convert their involuntary and careless victim into a traitor to his

country.

As a matter of fact every honest Soviet citizen has every opportunity of thwarting the sordid designs of the spies, of extricating himself from the web that had been woven round him and of being useful to his country by exposing the annoying and importunate spies. All that is necessary is to remember that if a mistake, or even a serious crime has been committed it is far better to confess it, to reveal it, to inform the Soviet authorities about it than to enter into a secret pact with the enemy of our country and to carry out their espionage instructions. It must be always borne in mind that anybody who has entered into a pact with a foreign secret service ceases to be his own master forever: beginning with innocent services he is gradually compelled to act at first as a spy and then uncomplainingly to carry out diversionist and terrorist acts. It is enough to give the spy a finger to enable him to become complete master of his victim and to convert an honest man into a traitor and assassin.

This was the case, for example, with the young engineer Stroilov, who was convicted at the recent Trotskyite espionage trial. This man was educated by the Soviet government and trained as a specialist. Having fallen into the hands of the spies he was gradually transformed

into a traitor to his country, a wrecker and diversionist. At first, while he was in Germany on Soviet business, the German spies gave him Trotsky's book to read, then they began to supply him with other counter-revolutionary literature, and after that they began to blackmail him, threatening to expose him to the Soviet authorities for associating with people like the German spy Berg, which would be enough to compromise him. Instead of honestly revealing the machinations of the German spies and thus saving himself from their persecution, Stroilov preferred to hush this up, and in return for the promise not to betray him to the Soviet authorities, he gave the German Secret



Service a written statement promising to provide them with information they wanted and thus placing himself entirely at the mercy of the Gestapo. He was given no rest when he returned to the U.S.S.R. but was compelled to engage in wrecking and acts of diversion. In this way the Gestapo erected a bridge between the spy Stroilov and the Trotskyite agents in the Kuznetsk Basin. And yet it should be clear to everyone that not only could Stroilov have averted the contemptible fate of a traitor, spy and diversionist, but by exposing the sordid intrigues of the agents of the Gestapo in time he could have been useful to his country and remained its loyal son.

On our Soviet territory spies operate with the greatest caution to avoid discovery by our Soviet and Party organizations and the organs of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs; but in their own land they behave with utmost cynicism, and are especially persistent with Soviet citizens who visit that country. Even when Soviet citizens are traveling through Poland or Germany en route to other countries they are accosted by "fellow travelers" who try their utmost to sound them out and drag them into their net.

A number of cases that have occurred show how vigilant our engineers, business leaders and other persons going abroad on business must be in order to avoid falling into traps cunningly laid for them by foreign espionage organizations.

A certain Soviet worker, whom we shall call "L," on arriving in a certain foreign country, decided to learn the language of that country and advertised for a teacher. Among the numerous replies to the advertisement there was one in which the applicant told a moving story of her poverty. She wrote that she was a teacher, the sole provider of

her family of three, and pleaded that the advertiser postpone his decision to engage a teacher until he had had a personal interview with her and also urged that her knowledge of the language and method of instruction were superior to all others. "L" was a bachelor and among his comrades was regarded as a good Party member, active in social work and modest in his every-day life. Although he was engaged in technical work his job was nevertheless a very responsible one, for in the course of his work he learned many important state secrets. He replied to the "needy" applicant and made an appointment for an interview. On the appointed date a young, good-looking woman, about 25 years of age, who called herself Mary, called on "L" and in the very first conversation charmed him by her modest appearance and touched him by the story of her poverty.



The lessons were given at "L's" lodgings and for several months things proceeded quite normally. During this period "L" became friendly with his teacher and they began to go for walks together, to visit the movies, etc. Gradually they became more intimate. During the lessons Mary never put any questions to "L" that might have aroused suspicion. She appeared not to understand much about politics, although she said that unknown to her mother, who was very religious, she read books about the Soviet Union and that had she had more spare time she would undoubtedly have shared the views of the Bolsheviks.

One evening, during the lesson, Mary felt bad. She asked "L" to call a doctor, a distant relative of hers named "N." When the doctor arrived Mary became worse and she had to lie down on the sofa. The doctor said that she was suffering from over-fatigue and a weak heart. He gave her a powder and said that she would feel relief soon and fall asleep. He asked "L" not to disturb her and allow her to remain quietly in the room. Hours passed, Mary still slept and at 3 a.m. "L" decided that even if she did wake up it would be too late to allow her to go home. Tired out with his vigil, "L" fell asleep himself.

On awakening in the morning he was astonished to find that Mary had gone. And he was still more astonished to find that the front and back doors were locked and the keys missing. He searched high and low for the keys but could not find them, and he had to telephone for a locksmith to come and break the locks. Instead of going to his

comrades and telling them what had happened, "L" feared that they would not believe his story and would think that something had happened between him and Mary, that they would not believe his story about the disappearance of the keys, that they would begin to talk about him, distort the facts and create a lot of trouble for him. "I will say nothing about it," "L" decided, "nobody but I knows anything about it." He did not suspect that the secret service, whose agent Mary was, had built all their plans precisely on this psychological point that "L" would be afraid to tell anybody about Mary having stayed the night at his lodgings and about the disappearance of the keys and the broken locks.

One evening, some time after, when "L" was beginning to forget these events, a stranger called and introduced himself as the agent of the secret service of that country and stated that his chief had instructed him to meet "L" to talk over the incident connected with Mary. He said that Mary had handed in a written statement to the secret service to the effect that a pupil of hers, a Soviet employee, to whom she had been giving lessons for many months during which he had behaved very decently, had treated her to tea and pastry at the last lesson. While she was eating, she alleged, she felt dizzy. "L" called the doctor who gave her a powder. After taking the powder she felt slightly better and fell asleep. During the night she was suddenly awakened by feeling a



weight on her body and sharp physical pain. When she became thoroughly awake she realized that "L" was trying to rape her, revealing in this the most sadistic passion, for he bit her in no less than 15 places. After a short sharp resistance she managed to free herself and escape to another room. But "L" pursued her and the struggle was resumed. Just as everything appeared to be lost, she, so Mary stated, snatched up the salt cellar from the table and threw the salt in "L's" eyes. Fearing that this would enrage "L" still more and that he would pursue her, she ran out of the house and locked the front and back doors. In proof of her statement Mary had submitted a bunch of keys and a certificate signed by Dr. "N" whom "L" called when Mary felt

bad, testifying that "L" had persuaded him not to take Mary home but to leave her at his lodgings. The certificate also stated that the next day Mary had visited Dr. "N" in a very disturbed condition and that on her body he had found 15 bites and bruises.

"L" listened to the agent's story as if in a trance and could not collect his thoughts. One thing he began clearly to understand and that was that he was on the edge of a precipice and entirely in the power of the stranger. He was struggling hard to think of a way of escape, but he did not realize that the only way was to go and tell his nearest friends, that any other decision would be fatal. The plan of the secret service was carefully drawn up. Its aim was psychologically to present the effort to recruit "L" for their work not as if they had instigated the whole affair and were trying to blackmail him, but as if they were his saviors who wanted to get him out of his trouble and therefore were deserving of some "slight" service in return.

The agent said that the secret service did not want to compromise "L" and create a scandal because he was not an ordinary person but a responsible employee of a country with which his government maintained normal diplomatic relations. As, however, they had received the complaint from Mary, they were obliged to report it to the Public Prosecutor. They had already interviewed Mary, he said, had questioned her and had suggested that she raise no scandal about the matter, but settle it quietly. Mary objected to this for a long time, but, finally, pressed hard by the secret service, she agreed on the condition that she receive a sum equal to 5,000 gold rubles within five days. At first "L" refused to hear of this. Later he offered a smaller sum, but the agent said that he was not authorized to carry on such negotiations.

A few days after, "L" met the agent and told him that he had not the money and could not obtain it. Three days after this a person met "L" by appointment and introduced himself as the Assistant Chief of the Secret Service. He hinted to "L" that he was ready to help him obtain the money from a bank, but that he expected "L" to compensate him for this service. The secret service did not ask much; he said, they wanted peace and order in the country, but they received many reports about people. Very often it was difficult to decide what was true and what was false, and, therefore, all they asked was that "L" give them his opinion about certain persons they were interested in.

"L" expected something very much worse. This request seemed to him to be a very innocent one. He even began to persuade himself that he was doing a good thing because he would be able to save Soviet people from slanderous attacks by the enemies of the Soviet Union.

One more step and "L" would have taken the fatal path of betraying his country.

However, the enemy did not triumph. "L's" comrades noticed that he was behaving rather strangely. Then they heard rumors about the breaking of the locks. They noticed that "L" was avoiding his friends, disappeared in the evenings and told lies in replies to questions. It was also noticed that "L" was selling many of his things and was trying to borrow money. They decided to have a comradely talk with him, and at last he found the courage to tell them all about it.

We have deliberately told this story in such detail in order to show how lack of vigilance – even in such a seemingly simple matter as choosing a language teacher- soothing oneself with the thought that the enemy is not as cunning as he is depicted to be, faint heartedness and lack of a sense of duty towards one's country, led an honest citizen of unstained character like "L" into the clutches of the bitterest enemies of our country who, as a rule, always start with a request for some slight service in order later on to compel their victim to commit murder, incendiarism and espionage.

A number of cases are known where the enemy, taking advantage of the dissoluteness of some Soviet citizens who go abroad on business, introduce them to women and then compel them to give satisfaction to the "offended husband" who



appears on the scene; and as compensation for not creating a scandal they compel the credulous and dissolute persons to act as spies and betray their country. This happened to a Soviet citizen, who formerly had had an irreproachable character,

who was on official business in Japan. He began to frequent restaurants and other places of amusement and became friendly with one of the frequenters of these places, a rather good-looking woman of "aristocratic appearance." During one of his meetings with this woman in a secluded corner of a fashionable restaurant, a Japanese in military uniform suddenly appeared and introduced himself as the "husband" of this woman and angrily demanded satisfaction for the insult to his honor and home. There would have been a scandal had not a kindly looking Japanese in civilian clothes appeared on the scene and persuaded the military man not to create a scandal and to settle the

matter quietly. The Soviet citizen, feeling that his position was desperate, clutched at this "conciliator" as if he was an anchor of salvation. The matter was settled "quietly," but at what price? The Soviet citizen gave the "conciliator" a written statement promising to give "information" about certain matters in the U.S.S.R. in which the "conciliator," who proved to be an agent of the Japanese secret service, was interested. But having given the written statement this Soviet citizen found himself in the clutches of the "conciliator." Fearing that the "conciliator" would betray him he began to become more and more entangled in the web of espionage, and carried out one espionage commission after another. He was converted into a Japanese spy and an enemy of his country.

There was the case of a certain Soviet official "N", who, while abroad on official business, fell into the clutches of the secret service of that country under the following circumstances. One day "N" went to a cafe. He had his briefcase with him, but it contained no business documents. After having several cups of coffee he went to the telephone, leaving his briefcase on the table. When he returned to the table, he found the briefcase where he had left it, and after sitting there a little while longer got up to go. At the door of the cafe he was accosted by a young man who asked him: "Are you so- and-so?" "N" replied in the affirmative. Then he young man asked "N" to step to one side and said to him: "You, Mr. 'N,' are a Soviet spy, violating the laws of this country. The police do not know about this yet, but you are entirely in my power. I can save you if you render me some service."

"N" angrily denied the accusation but the young man told him not to get excited, he could not get out of the business for there were documents in his briefcase of an espionage nature. Feeling sure that there could be no incriminating documents in his briefcase, "N" immediately opened it to prove this; but to his horror, among the other papers in the briefcase he found a document, written in a foreign language bearing a secret mark, which evidently had been put there while he was at the telephone. When "N" angrily accused the stranger of having put the document into the briefcase the latter replied: "Keep calm, Mr. 'N.' I do not know how you are going to extricate yourself from this situation. I want to help you, but if you reject my offer I will immediately report you to the police."

To cut a long story short, instead of immediately stopping this conversation and, being an honest man of unstained character, immediately reporting the matter to the police himself, "N" began to seek for a compromise with the stranger and at last, in order to "avoid a

scandal," agreed to obtain and pass on information about a certain person living in the Soviet Union. But having ensnared "N" in his web, the spy did not limit himself to this. He would not release "N" until he had obtained from him a written confirmation of his consent to carry out this commission. As "N" did not see any other way of escaping the spy's persecution, he committed the fatal mistake and gave the latter a written undertaking to carry out his commission. And this written obligation hung like a millstone around "N's" neck for the rest of his life. Using this written undertaking and threatening to publish it, the agents of the fascist secret service reached "N" wherever he went, and starting from what at first sight seemed an innocent commission, they "loaded" "N" with real espionage work, compelled him to betray his country and to become a contemptible, mercenary spy in the hands of the fascist secret service.

Cases are also known where spies have ensnared people in their nets by taking advantage of their moral instability while abroad. For example, a Soviet worker on a commission in a foreign country made the acquaintance in the course of his duties of a number of officials of foreign consulates. One of them, who presented himself as a wealthy man, frequently invited this Soviet citizen, whom we shall call "T," to join him in various pleasures such as going to the races, theatres, night clubs, cabarets and similar places. This foreigner always insisted on paying for these entertainments. Thus "T" began to spend his spare time mostly with this generous acquaintance, visited various expensive places of amusement and was drawn into a life of pleasure.

But one fine day the "benefactor" informed "T" that he was bankrupt and that his creditors were pressing for immediate payment. He therefore asked "T" to recompense him for all the expenses incurred during their joint pleasures. When "T" heard the amount that was asked for he was astounded, for he had never spent such a sum in the foreigner's company. The foreigner, however, insisted upon immediate payment. Naturally, "T" could not obtain such a sum and so his boon companion suggested a way of "saving" them both, namely, that "T" give certain information of a minor character to a certain man of substance who could use this information to great commercial advantage. When "T" refused, his "friend" began to threaten that he would immediately inform "T's" chief about the immoral life he had



been leading, about their joint pleasures, and, incidentally, about the secret information which, he said, "T" had already blurted out. "Would it not be better for you to give this harmless information," said the spy to "T," "than to risk your good name, and perhaps even your life, and also the utter wreck of your family, for your wife would never forgive your immoral conduct? Would it not be better to let all that has occurred pass into oblivion by giving my friend certain information the divulging of which will not cause anybody any harm?"

Not having the courage to tell his comrades of his reprehensible conduct, of his association with hostile elements, and thus saving himself from sinking still lower. "T" gave written consent to provide the information asked for and in return obtained from his acquaintance a worthless written undertaking not to demand any money from him and not to blackmail him. "T" ended up by trying, on the demand of his new masters, to steal a secret document, and was caught in the act.



A case is known where the German Secret Service tried to employ against a Soviet citizen, who had gone abroad on official business, the following clumsy method to recruit him. On arrival the Soviet citizen looked for lodgings. He inspected several places and finally decided to take a room that was being let by an elderly woman. During his conversation with the landlady a young woman was present who introduced herself as the landlady's friend. Having discussed the terms on which the room was to be let, the comrade referred to promised to call within a day or two

to settle the matter. When he called he again met the landlady who asked him to wait a little as she had to consult some relatives of hers who lived next door before finally letting the room. The comrade waited in the hall smoking a cigarette. A few minutes later the landlady appeared, accompanied by a police inspector and a police sergeant. The inspector stated that the landlady had entered a complaint to the effect that when the comrade had visited the apartment on the first occasion he had stolen two gold rings. As nobody had visited the apartment either before or after he had inspected the room, suspicion fell on him.

The inspector asked the comrade to go to the police station to draw up an official report. The comrade protested very strongly but without avail. He was obliged to go to the police station and there he was subjected to a humiliating examination, and they even tried to search him. When the inspector realized that the search would be strongly resisted he suddenly adopted a friendly tone and said that perhaps the citizen was not guilty, but there was evidence and he had to search him or else draw up a report and submit the matter to the Prosecutor. Meanwhile he would have to detain him. As, however, he realized what a scandalous matter this would be for him, he was prepared for a small sum to "avoid unpleasantness," hush the matter up and let the "thief" go.

Unfortunately, the comrade, eager to get out of his awkward position as quickly as possible, without thinking of the consequences, took out his wallet and, extracting a 20-mark note, put it on the inspector's table. Just at that moment the door opened and a genteel but modestly dressed young man who, notwithstanding his civilian clothes, bore all the marks of a military officer, entered the room. He said that he was in the next room and had heard the comrade offer the police inspector a bribe. As the senior officer it was his duty to draw up a report of this. After questioning the inspector about the reasons for detaining the Soviet citizen, the officer stated that the attempt to bribe the inspector was direct proof of his guilt and immediately demanded that a report be drawn up stating that he had tried to secure his release by means of a bribe. At the same time he ordered the Soviet citizen to be immediately taken into custody. The report was drawn up, but the comrade refused to sign it. The officer then sent the inspector out of the room and when he had gone he informed the comrade that he was an officer in the secret service having the activities of the police under his observation. He fully appreciated the scandal this incident would create, he said, and expressed his readiness to assist the unfortunate Soviet citizen. He could not do this, however, without obtaining some service in return. He proposed therefore that the Soviet citizen obtain information for him about another Soviet citizen then living in the Soviet Union. Our simpleton, not suspecting anything, wrote the name and address of the person in question in his note book and at the officer's request wrote the same name and address in Russian in the officer's notebook. Then, thinking that he had got off quite lightly with the help of the officer of the secret service, he left the police station and went home.

On the way home our friend thought over what had happened and wondered whether he should tell his comrades about it, but fearing that he would be laughed at he decided not to tell anybody and tried to forget about it. Two weeks later, however, he received a telephone call at his house stating that the officer of the secret service desired to see him to discuss a matter which he knew about. It was only after this that our simpleton realized what was in the wind. He then decided immediately to inform his chief about what had happened and so saved himself from the fate which awaited him if he had allowed himself to be drawn deeper into the despicable farce arranged by the secret service. When the secret service agent began to press him and threaten to expose him, our comrade told him in very sharp terms that he had himself informed his chief and that an official protest would be made against the despicable spying methods which the secret service employed against honest Soviet citizens. The secret service, however, did not let the matter rest for a long time, desiring not to lose its intended prey, and tried to resort to intimidation. But all their efforts were unavailing as a result of the honest and straightforward conduct of the Soviet citizen.



The examples quoted above only slightly raise the curtain on the sordid and revolting methods employed by foreign, and in particular, fascist secret services to drag innocent people into their espionage net. Truthfulness, honesty in relation to the Soviet state, a sense of duty to one's country, vigilance, conscientious fulfillment of duties and self-

control should protect every Soviet citizen against these despicable efforts of our enemies.

Resorting to the most sordid methods in their espionage work, the fascist secret service realize that the methods they employ can also be used by other bourgeois secret services and can be adopted more or less against themselves. In order to make their subjects to some extent immune against these methods the fascists demonstrate one cinema film after another for the purpose of familiarizing them with the methods employed by foreign espionage agencies. Films such as *Mata Hari* (a well-known German spy in Paris), *Port Arthur*, *Natasha* and *Traitor* are widely popularized. The last- mentioned film illustrates the

work of foreign spies in Germany. Special emphasis is laid in this film on a German airman who was entangled in the spies' net, but was not scared by the false documents which were fabricated to entrap him and had the courage to tell his chief about the trouble he had got into. For this he was publicly thanked in front of his regiment. On the other hand, the fascists do all they can to idealize their own spies and have published quantities of utterly false literature describing their exploits.

The object of all this is to dazzle people with the "romance" of spying. Most of these fascist "romancers" are being trained for work in foreign countries. Their aim is to creep through the loopholes created by laxity, complacency and relaxed vigilance, in order to perform their despicable deeds of murder, wrecking and espionage.

For the purpose of fulfilling their functions the espionage organizations have at their command a powerful organization which resorts to every legal and illegal method of permeating the organism of neighboring countries. Notwithstanding the veil of secrecy which conceals espionage operations, the World War, the post-war period and the present pre-war period provide an abundance of facts showing how widely espionage operations are carried on. Espionage organizations spread their tentacles around government offices, large factories connected with the work of defense, and the transport system, for the purpose of discovering state secrets, secrets connected with defense and technical improvements, and for the purpose of getting their people appointed to important posts to organize wrecking acts of diversion and treachery. Espionage is continuous, concealed war, waged by armies of spies, and does not cease for a moment. This is shown by the numerous trials behind closed doors which have taken place recently in America, Great Britain, France, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Spain.